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CRITIQUE OF A REVISION OF SOME
FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
THEODORE
I.

M.

AvE-LALLEMANT

INTRODUCTION

ROFESSORS Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means conclude
their valuable treatise on "The Modern Corporation and Private
Property" with a Book (the fourth) on "Effects of the Corporate
System on Fundamental Economic Concepts." The concepts treated,
as requiring revision because of the effects of the corporate system
upon them, are the following: Private Property, Wealth, Private Enterprise, Individual Initiative, the Profit Motive, and Competition. In
the final chapter (Chapter IV of Book IV), the concept of the corporation is treated as a new and, presumedly, also fundamental economic
concept. It is this revision of fundamental economic concepts and the
grounds upon which it is predicated that will be made the subject of
critical examination in this paper.
The following questions call for an answer: (1) Is it true, indeed,
that the existence of a fully developed corporate system necessitates
a modification or revision of the fundamental economic concepts
named? (2) Is the revision proposed by the authors as thorough a revision as they seem to think it is? (3) If a revision of the concepts
under consideration is indeed necessary, in any measure, is the mere
existence of the corporate system alone a sufficient guide to the scope
and character of the revision called for?
In the Preface to their treatise, the authors say that the observations recorded in the concluding Book "must be set aside from the data
contained in the foregoing study. From any given body of material,
each individual must draw his own conclusions; these are likely to be
as diverse as the minds of the men who study them." (Page vii.) This
statement is undoubtedly true in so far as it purports to be merely a
statement of fact. But, to this writer's reading, there seems to lie in it
an implication which at least appears to suggest an apologetic reflection.
If the results reached by different men on the basis of the same material are divergent results, we may explain this divergence by the diversity of "the minds of the men who study" the material. That would be
a psychological explanation of the fact of diversity in the results. The
authors have, indeed, rendered a service to the readers of their study
by facilitating for them a psychological explanation of the conclusions
they profess to have reached. Their own conclusions, they declare,
are "set down because it appears to them proper that the deductions
and speculations of the students working in the material should be
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recorded alongside their views as to the underlying facts. In some sense
they permit discounting the fact data by exhibiting the bias of the
writers, making judgment of their fact-finding truer." Still, with all
necessary allowances made for the, psychologically explainable, "diversity" and "bias" of the authors' minds, the major question of the
logical validity of their "deductions and speculations" remains for
examination. The discussion presented in this paper is wholly directed
to an examination of the logical validity of the deductions and speculations presented in the concluding Book of the treatise under review.

II.

THE AUTHORS' METHOD OF REVISION

The authors contend that, by the application of "the traditional
logic of property" and of "the traditional logic of profits," the science
of economics and the science of the law have obtained divergent results. They conclude that, "when such divergent results are obtained by
the application of the logic of two major social disciplines to a new
fact situation, we must push our inquiry still further back into the
assumptions and concepts of those disciplines." (Page 345.) In the
preceding three Books of the treatise, they have inquired diligently
enough into the "assumptions and concepts" of the science of law, with
respect to rights and obligations under the corporate system. In the
Fourth Book, they turn to an examination of the "assumptions and
concepts" of the discipline of economics.
The conclusions which the authors have reached through that examination will receive our attention. If other men, studying the same
material, should reach divergent conclusions, the supporters of each of
the divergent views may, if they wish, take refuge in a psychological
explanation of the divergence of views, accounting for their diversity
by the diversity of the minds of the men who have studied the same
factual data. Important as may be the consequences of the diversities
of minds however, the more important cause of diversities in results
is to be found in the differences in the methods with which different
disciplines approach the sa me material. The authors themselves have
recognized this, where they compare the interests and the approach to
the facts of the economist and of the man of the law, respectively.
(Page 340, the first paragraph.) But even there they have not, as it
seems to the writer, drawn the distinction properly and clearly; for
they seem to attribute to the economist interests and presuppositions
which are not the distinctive interests and presuppositions of his
science, however much they may be those of the economist as individual and as citizen. Of that point more will be said later; for before
we enlarge upon this point we must take note of even more funda-
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mental presuppositions that seem to underlie the authors' own revisionistic impulses.
Professors Berle and Means declare, page 345, in what will prove
to be the crucial chapter (Book IV, Chapter III, treating of "The Inadequacy of Traditional Theory") that, "underlying the thinking of
economists, lawyers and business men during the last century and a
half has been the picture of economic life so skillfully painted by
Adam Smith. Within his treatise on the 'Wealth of Nations' are contained the fundamental concepts which run through most modern
thought." Now, there is no question of the truth of the first sentence
as a statement of fact: the "picture of economic life so skillfully painted by Adam Smith" has not lost its fascination for its readers, economists and others. Where the authors are in error is in their second
sentence, that is, in the methodological implications-also revealed in
other sections of the chapter-which in themselves are indefensible.
Within Adam Smith's treatise on the "Wealth of Nations," they say,
"are contained the fundamental concepts which run through most modem thought." (The italics are the writer's.) That statement may be
true enough as a simple statement of fact; the issue for debate arises
over the methodological implications which the statement, by the evidence of what follows, is made to carry. For there is the implication
that the said "fundamental concepts" are contained in Adam Smith's
treatise because they have been put into it in and by "the picture of
economic life" which he has "so skillfully painted." The implication of
that, again, is that, if it proves that the "picture of economic life" must
be re-painted, because of changed conditions and changed relationships
in the economic life, the "fundamental concepts" of economic science
must also be refashioned. This implication the authors explicitly pronounce; for they say (page 345) that the concepts and terms delivered
to us by Adam Smith "have ceased to be accurate, and therefore tend
to mislead in describing modern enterprise as carried on by the great
corporations. Though both the terms and the concepts remain, they are
inapplicable to a dominant area in American economic organization.
New terms, connoting changed relationships, become necessary."
It would be going too far if one were to attribute to the authors
an explicit avowal of the belief that in and by a skillful re-painting of
economic life-as the authors have accomplished it for "a dominant
area in American economic organization"-we should eo ipso be accomplishing a refashioning of "fundamental economic concepts," more
accurate and better applicable to the changed conditions and changed
relationships painted in the new picture. However, such conclusions on
method are clearly enough suggested in their text. Fortunately, this
implied conclusion has not wholly vitiated the authors' analysis of the
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"fundamental economic concepts" which they have examined; on the
other hand, the present writer finds that, just in so far as he cannot
accept this analysis as valid and conclusive, its unacceptability is due,
precisely, to the vitiating influence of the methodological assumption
indicated. With a view to critical correction, reference may here be
made to a very fine essay by Professor John Dewey on "Qualitative
Thought" (pages 93-116 in his collection of essays and addresses entitled "Philosophy and Civilization" 1932), in which the difference between description and analysis and between thought sufficiently refined
for qualitative description and the more sharply defined thought of
conceptualized analysis is clearly and brilliantly set forth.

-

III. PRIVATE PROPERTY
The first "fundamental economic concept" which the authors undertake to revise is the concept of PrivateProperty.When we examine
this revision we shall see how much the authors' analysis is affected
by qualitative description, by the "picture" of economic life with its
changing conditions and changing relationships.
"When," they write, "Adam Smith talked of 'enterprise', he had
in mind as the typical unit the small individual business in which the
owner, perhaps with the aid of a few apprentices or workers, labored
to produce goods for market or to carry on commerce. Very emphatically he repudiated the stock corporation as a business mechanism,
holding that dispersed ownership made efficient operation impossible.
* * * Yet when we speak of business enterprise today, we must have
in mind primarily these very units which seemed to Adam Smith not
to fit into the principles which he was laying down for the conduct of
economic activity. How then can we apply the concepts of Adam Smith
in discussing our modem economy?"
Two distinct criticisms must be brought against this statement.
There is, in the first place, the criticism, already indicated, of the unjustifiable assumption that description, the "picture of economic life,"
in and of itself does or should determine the content of concepts,
which, properly, is determined by the processes of analysis. The practical purport of this criticism is that the "fundamental economic concepts" developed or utilized by Adam Smith may well have been adequate for the conceptual analysis of the economic life which he was
describing; it may equally well be that they are adequate-we are not
for the present deciding whether they are or not-for the conceptual
analysis of the economic life of today, which differs so greatly, in its
conditions and in its relationships, from the economic life of Adam
Smith's time.
The second criticism is directed against a mixing of two lines of
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thought which, unawares to the authors, it seems, has crept into the
discussion. Adam Smith, they say, "emphatically * * * repudiated the
stock corporationas a business mechanism, holding that dispersed ownership made efficient operation impossible." And, again, they declare
that "we must have in mind primarily these very units which seemed
to Adam Smith not to fit into the principleswhich he was laying down
for the conduct of economic activity." Now, to describe and explain
what a stock corporation represents as a business mechanism, is one
thing; to repudiate it as a business mechanism, is a very different thing.
To describe and explain the principles which are, as a matter of fact,
followed in the conduct of economic activity is one thing; to lay down
principles which should be followed is, again, a very different thing.
For a picture of the changes in conditions and relationships which
have made our contemporary economic life so greatly to differ from
the economic life of Adam Smith's time, we have to go to the First
Book of the authors' treatise. This Book treats of "Property in Flux"
and concentrates on the "Separation of the Attributes of Ownership
under the Corporate System."
Concordantly with the theme and thesis of their treatise, the authors contend that, with the emergence and development of the corporate system, "there has resulted the dissolution of the old atom of ownership into its component parts, control and beneficial ownership."
(Book I, Chapter I, page 8-this chapter treating of "Property in
Transition.") In the sixth, and concluding, chapter of Book I (this
chapter treating of "The Divergence of Interest Between Ownership
and Control"), this contention is more sharply defined, in the following
language:
"The foregoing chapters have indicated that the corporate system
tends to develop a division of the functions formerly accorded to ownership. This calls for an examination of the exact nature of these functions; the inter-relation of the groups performing them, and the new
position which these groups hold in the community at large.
"In discussing problems of enterprise it is possible to distinguish
between three functions: that of having an interest in an enterprise,
that of having power over it, and that of acting with respect to it.
A single individual may fulfill, in varying degrees, any one or more of
these functions." (Page 119.)
Even at the risk of being charged with carping criticism, one must
point out a certain looseness in the use of terms which occurs in the
first paragraph just quoted. Properly speaking, functions cannot be
"accorded to ownership." "Ownership" is a relation between a person
(the owner) and a thing (the thing owned, the property). Now, relations cannot be bearers of function; relations do not "function,"
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whereas the terms of the relation, in this case a person (as owner)
and a thing (the property) can and do "function." The meaning, of
course, is clear from the context. The functions in questions have been
accorded to owners, not to ownership.
Criticism of the statements contained in the second paragraph
quoted just above is more weighty and of greater consequence; it is
far from being merely carping criticism.
"Having interest in an enterprise," the present writer would say, is
not a function but a relation, precisely that relation among possible
relations which we describe as the relation of ownership. Again, "having power over" an enterprise, is not a function but a relation. It is,
moreover, a relation which, by definition under existing and accepted
law, is implied in the relation of ownership. Ownership of a thing, the
law holds, implies the power of disposal over that thing. Even to say
that ownership of a thing "confers" power over it, would, so it seems
to the writer, put clarity of thought and expression in jeopardy. Ownership, being a relation, cannot function in "conferring power" any
more than in any other way.
The third "function" enumerated is, then, the only real function to
be considered. Of course, the function of "acting with respect to" an
enterprise, is a very comprehensive function. By implication here and
by explicit statement in other parts of the treatise, the authors by definition have quite unwarrantably restricted the function of "acting with
respect to an enterprise" to certain types of action. The types of action
to which such action has been restricted by them are the actions of
"management" and of "control." This is an unwarranted restriction;
for, clearly, if a person who has an interest in an enterprise avails
himself of the services of the security market for the liquidation of
his interest, he certainly is acting with respect to the enterprise. The
authors even admit expressly that by the possibility and the threat of
such liquidation the owner exercises a not inconsiderable "control"
over the enterprise. If a shareholder sells his entire interest in an enterprise, he alters his relation thereto by divesting himself of his interest
in it. If he buys additional shares, he increases his interest and thereby,
again, alters his relation to the enterprise. Both his purchase of additional shares and the sale of his shares-or the threat of the sale of
them-represent an exercise of the power of control over the enterprise which his ownership implies.
This restriction of the function of "acting with respect to an enterprise" which the authors have chosen is, however, a condition prerequisite to the upholding of the declared thesis of their study. The
thesis of the book, already stated above, is to show that, through the
emergence and the development of the corporate system, "there has
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resulted the dissolution of the old atom of ownership into its component parts, control and beneficial ownership." (Page 8.) The contention is made that '"the corporate system" has "attracted to itself a
combination of attributes and powers" which as a matter of fact as
well as a matter of (moral) right and law (natural as well as customary and positive?) are "attributes of ownership."
The thought here runs to the effect that the owner of an enterprise
manages that enterprise (if so he does) and has a right to manage it
by virtue of his relation of ownership to the enterprise in question.
That thought represents the traditional logic of property and the
writer cannot see that Professors Berle and Means have abandoned it
in their revision of the fundamental concept of private property. If
there is to be (or should be) a revision of that concept, this revision
will have to be both more radical and more logical than the revision
offered by Messrs. Berle and Means. As a matter of fact, a sufficiently
radical and logical revision entails a reading of the relation between
Rights and Functions which is the direct inverse of the reading of that
relation by the traditional logic of property. As the traditional logic
of property reads that relation, Functions flow from Rights. According
to a contrary (not the contradictory) reading of that relation, Rights
flow from Functions. Or, to put the same thought in another way, the
traditional logic of property holds that when the relation of ownership
is established (howsoever) between a person and a thing, and the
rights of ownership vested upon or embodied in the person of the
owner, the right to perform the function of "acting with respect to"
(for example, managing) the enterprise is thereby also vested upon
or embodied in the person of the owner. Per contra, according to the
revised logic of property here suggested, if the performance of the
function of managing an enterprise is assigned to a person, for the best
of all reasons, his capacity for the performance of the function, that
person must, and will, command certain rights in keeping with the
rights of his office and required in support of the proper performance
of his duties thereunder. In other words, while his rights may, perhaps,
not flow from his functiorv--in the sense that, in the opposite view,
functions are said to flow from rights-he must command the necessary rights or fail in his function.
The adherence of Professors Berle and Means to the traditional
logic of property, their avowed repudiation of it notwithstanding, is
clear by the evidence of the following passage (Book I, Chapter VI,
pp. 119-120) :
" Before the industrial revolution the owner-worker performed all
three functions named above, as do most farmers today. But during
the nineteenth century the bulk of industrial production came to be
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carried on by enterprises in which a division had occurred, the owner
fulfilling the first two functions while the latter was in large measure
performed by a separate group, the hired managers. Under such a system of production, the owners were distinguished primarily by the
fact that they were in a position both to manage an enterprise or delegate its management and to receive any profits or benefits which might
accrue. The managers on the other hand were distinguished primarily
by the fact that they operated an enterprise, presumably in the interests
of the owners. The difference between ownership and management was
thus in part one between position and action. An owner who remained
completely quiescent towards his enterprise would nevertheless remain
an owner. His title was applied not because he acted or was expected
to act. Indeed, when the owner acted, as for instance in hiring a manager or giving him directions, to that extent the owner managed his
own enterprise. On the other hand, it is difficult to think of applying
the title 'manager' to an individual who had been entirely quiescent.
"Under the corporate system, the second function, that of having
power over an enterprise, has become separated from the first. The
position of the owner has been reduced to that of having a set of legal
and factual interests in the enterprise while the group which we have
called control, are in the position of having legal and factual powers
over it."
This separation of functions-more properly put, this partial divestment of the owner of one of his relations to the enterprise, or,
still better, this modification of his relation thereto, and the establishment of a new, or more intimate, relation between the enterprise and
a new group of persons (management and control)-is made by the
authors the basis of their revision of the concept of private property.
As already pointed out above, their revison takes a "picture of economic life" as its starting-point.
"To Adam Smith and to his followers," they write, "private property was a unity involving possession. He assumed that ownership and
control were combined. Today, in the modem corporation, this unity
has been broken. Passive property,-specifically, shares of stock or
bonds,--gives its possessors an interest in an enterprise but gives them
practically no control over it, and involves no responsibility. Active
property,--plant, good will, organization, and so forth which make up
the actual enterprise,--is controlled by individuals who, almost invariably, have only minor ownership interests in it. In terms of relationships, the present situation can be described as including:-(1) "passive property," consisting of a set of relationships between an individual toward the enterprise but almost no effective powers over it; and
(2) "active property," consisting of a set of relationships under which
an individual or set of individuals hold powers over an enterprise but
have almost no duties in respect to it which can be effectively enforced.
When active and passive property relationships attach to the same individual or group, we have private property as conceived by the older
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economists. When they attach to different individuals, private property
in the instruments of production disappears." (Pages 346-347.)
Now, we have in this passage really two distinct definitions of the
two components-"passive property" and "active property"-into
which the authors have broken up the former unity of the "old atom of
ownership." Under the first definition, "passive property"-specifically,
shares of stock and bonds-is passive because its owner is passive, does
not fulfill the function of "acting with respect to the enterprise."
"Active property"-that which makes up the actual enterprise, "plant,
good will, organization, and so forth"-is described as active because
individuals or a set of individuals other than the owner or owners act
with respect to it. Passivity and activity are not really predicated of
property at all, but of two different classes of persons, passive and active, respectively. In the first definition, the thought is of the objective
property: shares of stock and bonds as passive, the actual enterprise
as active property. In the second definition, both "passive" and "active
property" are defined as "a set of relationships," the difference between the respective sets of relationship, again, being entirely determined by the passivity or activity of the persons respectively involved
in the relationship. We find here, again, the restriction of the honorific
terms action and active to one type of activity only, that being the
activity of management and control.
In the end, our authors remain puzzled by and helpless before the
developments which they have so skillfully pictured. They deplore
the divergence between the results obtained by two major social disciplines, economics and law. In reality, there is no occasion whatever for
lament. The interests and the objectives of the two disciplines, economics and law, are so different that divergent results must be expected.
Why has the law, throughout its tradition, been so much concerned
over the close association between "property" and "management?" It
has been so concerned, because the experience of economic life, in a
certain stage of its development, has shown such close association to be
necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of everyone concerned.
The best management is subject to the making of mistakes of judgment and of practice. Obligations to creditors, for example, may be
contracted which, when they fall due, cannot be met, perhaps because
of the mistakes of management or because the enterprise has suffered
losses through the spread and generalization of a business depression
to the making of which its management may have contributed little
or nothing. Claims for damages to property or injury to persons may
result, for example, from the negligence or torts of employes for which
the enterprise as employer is held legally responsible. The law has been
concerned to provide recovery or compensation in such cases. But in
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order that there may be the possibility of recovery or compensation,
the person or persons held legally responsible must possess property
which is subject to legal judgment, assessment and seizure. Hence the
close association between "management" and "property," which the
law has quite properly supported.
The economist, on the other hand, has very different interests and
objectives. As the authors properly say: "His interest is not primarily
in the protection of man in his own, but in the production and distribution of what man desires." (Page 340.) Consequently the economist is not at all concerned over the association between property and
management. He realizes and experience teaches that persons, by
virtue of their property rights, may be put into a position which
admits them to the management of an enterprise which they are quite
incapable of managing efficiently and properly. In consequence of their
mistakes in management, they may lose both the property and, thereby,
the opportunity and right to manage it. Another person or persons,
acquiring the property, will therewith acquire the opportunity and right
to manage it. The appearance of the corporate system as a form of
economic organization neither has made nor ever will make, so long
as private property remains, any difference either in the process or in
the result. The development of the corporate system has made possible,
there is no denying it, the separation of ownership and management
and control. It has made this possible by providing for the satisfaction
of claims to recovery and damages out of the property of the owners
(shareholders) of the corporate enterprise while attaching little or no
liability to the person or persons who, by their mistakes in management, for
example, may have given cause and occasion for such claims.
I
A revision of the fundamental concept of private property, fashioned from the economic point of view, will call for the recognition
of the fact that the ownership of an enterprise is not necessarily the
only nor, under all circumstances, the best warrantfor the admission of
a person to the performance of the functions of management and control of economic enterprises. This revision will also recognize the fact
that the close association between ownership and management, in the
past, has been warranted because it has been the best means for safeguarding the interests of a variety of persons, entering into various
relations with an enterprise, against the incidence upon them of the
consequences of mistakes and malfeasances in the management of the
enterprise. Practical experience and the ingenuity of the men of the law
may devise other means of safeguarding such interests; in a considerable measure that has already been accomplished in the corporate
system.
Professors Berle and Means criticize severely and justly the abuses
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of the power, too frequently exercised as if it were an absolute power,
which has fallen into the hands of management and the so-called
"control." But neither the fact of such abuses nor the patent necessity
for criticism and correction entails any revision of the fundamental
concept of private property. If they, and the changed conditions and
changed relationships in economic life which they have accompanied
and out of which they have grown, do indeed suggest a re-examination
of the content and implications of that concept, it may be found, as
here suggested, that the revision will need to be even more thoroughgoing, but in a different direction, than the revision proposed by Professors Berle and Means. Conceivably such more thorough-going revision could have been made, and probably should have been made,
even before the development of the corporate system made our minds
ready to entertain any thought of revision. In any case, a thoroughgoing logical revision of fundamental economic (or other) concepts is
much less affected with relativity and contingency upon historical institutional developments than is suggested or implied in the methodological presuppositions that underlie the revising procedure followed by
our authors.
To put our critical objections to the authors' method and, per consequence, our exceptions to some of their results, in technical phraseology, perhaps, but tersely, we may say that these objections are chiefly
two: (1) an objection to the "historism" of their method, which makes
the logical revision of concepts contingent upon historical events and
developments and therefore affects them with relativity and the necessity of constant and recurrent revision as "the picture of economic life"
changes its aspects and requires to be re-painted. (2) An objection to
the 'sociologism" of their method, which finds the motivation for the
logical revision of concepts less in the (demonstrated or suspected)
lack of clearness and self-consistency in the structure of the concept
itself than in misapplication of the (possibly quite valid) concept as
an instrument for the rationalization and justification of reprehensible
action. Of our objection on the grounds of "historism"-which is
merely a variant of realistic empiricism-we have already said enough.
We shall have more to say of our objections on the ground of "sociologism"-and of the inconclusiveness for the logical enterprise undertaken by our authors of the pragmatic test which such "sociologism"
implies-when we come to the authors' proposals toward the revision
of the concepts of Profits.
IV.

WEALTH

The proposed revision of the fundamental economic concept of
"Wealth" can be considered more briefly. Here, again, Professors
Berle'and Means compare the concept as it is found in the writings of
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Adam Smith with the concept as it has been revised by them. The
impulse to revision again arises from the changes in "the picture of
economic life" which the development of "the corporate system" has
brought about. Again, the outstanding characteristic of the change piuduced is taken to be the breaking up of wealth into "passive wealth"
and "active wealth."
"To Adam Smith, wealth was composed of tangible things,--wheat
and land and buildings, ships and merchandise * * * " On the other

hand, "in connection with the modern corporation, two essentially
different types of wealth exist." There is: (1) "Passive Property,"
which represents not "tangible goods" but "a bundle of expectations
which have a market value and which, if held, may bring him (the
stockholder) income and, if sold in the market, may give him power
to obtain some form of other wealth ;" and (2) "active wealth," which
means to the possessor, the so-called "control," "a great enterprise
which he dominates, an enterprise whose value is for the most part
composed of the organized relationship of tangible properties, the
existence of a functioning organization of workers and the existence
of a functioning body of consumers." (Page 248.)
The critical objections already raised in the preceding section also
apply to this revision and with the same force. There is, to be sure, a
difference in character between "tangible goods" as wealth and a
"bundle of expectations" which have a market value because (1) they
represent claims to income and/or because (2) they are exchangeable
for (a) tangible goods or (b) other but similar "bundles of expectation." The difference is similar to the difference between two distinct
things designated by,equally distinct (but frequently confused) uses of
the word "capital." Readers of this article may be advised to consult
the brief and lucid discussion of the differences in fact and in terminology contributed to the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (Volume
III, pp. 187-190, sub verbo "Capital") by Professor Frank A. Fetter.
A few brief, particularly pertinent, passages may be quoted here, as
follows:
"The manifold derivative meanings (derivative from capital defined as an interest-bearing sum of money) are all of two types, the
one implying ownership of a valuable source of income, the other the
stock of physical goods constituting the income source. The one idea
was from the first characteristically individual, acquisitive and commercial, that of any financial fund having monetary expression; the
other idea was characteristically impersonal and technological, that of
the physical goods used to extract, transport, create or alter goods,
ships, stores of merchandise, money, tools, machines, houses and, usually but not always, lands." * * *

"A business as a whole might be thought of either as the sum or
fund of purchasing power invested, or as the mass of goods which,
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although not bought with borrowed funds, embodied the owner's business fund." * * *
"While recognizing divergent usage, we may define capital as the
market value expression of individual claims to incomes, whether they
have their sources in the technical uses of wealth or elsewhere. This
is essentially an individual acquisitive, financial, investment, ownership
concept. It is a 'fund' only in the financial sense, not a stock of wealth.
It is the sum, in terms of dollars, of the present worths of various legal
claims. It therefore includes the worth of all available and marketable
intangibles, such as credits, promises, good will, franchises, patents,
etc., as well as the worth of claims to the uses of physical forms of
wealth. Their summation as a financial fund is the resultant of a capitalization process. Physical objects of value are not capital, being sufficiently designated as goods, wealth or agents."
Now, Professors Berle and Means propose the use of the term
"passive property"-or "passive wealth"-to designate the economic
entity for which alone Professor Fetter has reserved the term "capital." For wealth as "characteristically impersonal and technological"
(Fetter), they propose the description "active property" (or "active
wealth"). But in so far as goods (specifically "capital goods") are
active as (factorial) agents of production in the production of other
goods and/or services, they are technologically active. With technology,
however, neither economics nor the science of law are directly concerned.
But the authors do not define such tangible property (goods,
wealth) as "active" because of its technological activity; they describe
it as "active" because a certain class of persons (collectively called
"management" or "control") "act with respect to it," their action
being, not technological but economic action. Be it noted again, however, that the adjective "active," according to the authors' notion, applies only if the function of "acting with respect to it" is fulfilled by a
person or set of persons other than tfie owner or owners of the
property, that is, under "the corporate system" with its separation of
the "function" of "having an interest in an enterprise," upon the one
hand, and the functions of "having power over it" and of "acting with
respect to it," upon the other. In other words, we again find their
analysis vitiated and invalidated by the "picture" of historically contingent conditions and relationships-a confusion which is the characteristic vice of "historism."
V.

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

In the authors' revision of the concept of Private Enterprise, we
find, besides the confusion characteristic of "historism," a further confusion in the use of terms which is so obvious that it is easily exposed.
To Adam Smith, it is said, "private enterprise meant an individual or
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few partners actively engaged and relying in large part on their own
labor or their immediate direction. Today we have tens and hundreds
of thousands of owners, of workers and of consumers combined in
single enterprises."
The distinction here made is one between "individual enterprise"
and "corporate enterprise." It is not a distinction between "private
enterprise" and enterprise which is other than private. The opposite of
"private enterprise" is "public enterprise." Both "individual enterprise"
and "corporate enterprise" are still "private enterprise," being merely
variant forms of it. Now, because "private enterprise" appears in (at
least) these two variant forms, our authors propose a revision of the
concept of "private enterprise." The logical grounds brought forward
for this revision are expressed in the plea that the prevailing (Smithian) concept of "private enterprise," like the other Smithian concepts,
is "inapplicable to a dominant area in American economic organization," that is to say, to private enterprise in its corporate variant form.
But that is an illegitimate procedure with concepts. Would an ornithologist think of defining the connotation of the concept "finch" and limit
its extension in consideration merely of the fact that the common English sparrow is the "dominant" representative of the class "finches?"
There appears here another vice of "historism," the vice of defining
class-concepts in terms of the "dominant" sub-division of the classthe same vice which we find so flagrantly exemplified in the definition,
by German racialists, of the "Nordic," the Aryan, or even the white
race in terms of the "dominant" (?) blond German of northern
Germany.
We find such methodological presuppositions clearly enunciated in
the following sentence. "These great associations" (of corporate enterprise) "are so different from the small, privately owned enterprises of
the past as to make the concept of private enterprise an ineffective
instrument of analysis." (Page 349.) What does this statement imply?
It implies a demand that concepts shall be descriptive-the more technical but also more precise term is "idiographic'"-, a demand which
involves a rejection of concepts as analytical, precisely because they
are that. Our authors call for concepts as instruments of analysis and
then propose to destroy this instrumental character demanded of them
by declaring that they must be descriptive. The concept of "private
enterprise" which they desire to apply to "corporate enterprise" as an
instrument of analysis is quite ineffective for that purpose, just because they demand at the same time that it shall be a pat description
of "corporate enterprise" as the dominant form of "private enterprise." These contradictory demands are merely a late American repetition-characteristic of Institutionalism in American economics--of
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the equally contradictory demands with which the Historical School of
economists confronted the representatives of economic theory.
VI.

INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE

The authors' brief discussion of "individual initiative" can scarcely
be called a revision-or even a re-analysis-of the concept. It amounts
to little more than the apodictic declaration that in modern industry,
especially under its corporate form of organization, individual liberty
and initiative are necessarily limited and curbed.
VII.

THE PROFIT

MOTIVE

The heading itself of this section (Book IV, Chapter III) suggests
the "sociologism" of the approach. What is discussed is not the formation and distribution of "profits" but profit-taking as the motivation of
individual economic activity. For better enlightenment on the function
of profits in the economy of private enterprise, we must turn to the
preceding chapter (Pages 340-344). The authors there point out that
"profits act as a return for the performance of two separate functions.
First, they act as an inducement to the individual to risk his wealth in
enterprise, and, second, they act as a spur, driving him to exercise his
utmost skill in making his enterprise piofitable. In the case of a private
enterprise the distinction between these two functions does not assume
importance. The owner of a private business receives any profits made
and performs the functions not only of risk-taking but of ultimate
management as well. It may be that in the past when industry was in
the main carried on by a multitude of small private enterprises the
community, through protecting property, has induced a large volume
of risk-taking and a vigorous conduct of industry in exchange for the
profits derived therefrom.
"In the modern corporation, with its separation of ownership and
control, these two functions of risk and control are, in the main, performed by two different groups of people. Where such a separation
is complete one group of individuals, the security holders and in particular the stockholders, performs the function of risk-takers and suppliers of capital, while a separate group exercises control and ultimate
management. In such a case, if profits are to be received only by the
security holders, as the traditional logic of property would require, how
can they perform both of their traditional economic roles? Are no
profits to go to those who exercise control and in whose hands the
efficient operation of enterprise ultimately rests ?" (Pages 341-342.)
Two alternatives between which the choice must be made in the
distribution of the net income of a corporate enterprise are open.
Professors Berle and Means have discussed these alternatives in the
chapter (the Second of Book IV) on "The Traditional Logic of
Profits," which is, in the opinion of this writer, the best in this
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concluding Book of their treatise. This discussion presents two aspects.
It represents, upon the one hand, deductions from the two traditional
logics, of property and of profits, respectively. It represents, on the
other hand, a description .of the changes in the conditions and relationships in economic life which have resulted from the emergence and
development of the corporate system. So long as individual enterprise
remained the dominant form of individual enterprise, the two traditional logics, it is contended, were mutually complementary components
in an essentially unitary economic philosophy, of Adam Smith's for
example, with harmony existing between its elements. With the development of the corporate system, however, diremption of its elements
was introduced into the economy of private enterprise and contradition-note, again, the pervasive "historism"-between the two traditional logics.
Under the system of individual private enterprise and according
to the traditional logics which supplied its ideologies, the profits in toto
belonged and accrued to the owners. The traditional logic of property,
by the common law extended to the quasi-public corporation to meet
a new factual situation, logically demanded the "award of the entire
profit to the security holders, and in particular to the stockholders.
According to this logic a corporation should be operated primarily in
their interests." (Page 334.)
But is the traditional logic still applicable to the new situation without a distortion of its internal consistency?
"In the past, the ownership of business enterprise * * * has always,
at least in theory, involved two attributes, first the risking of previously collected wealth in profit-seeking enterprises; and, second, the ultimate management of and responsibility for the enterprise. But in the
modern corporation, these two attributes of ownership no longer attach to the same individual or group. The stockholder has surrendered
control over his wealth. He has become a supplier of capital, a risktaker pure and simple, while ultimate responsibility and authority are
exercised by directors and 'control'. One traditional attribute of ownership is attached to stock ownership; the other attribute is attached to
corporate control. Must we not, therefore, recognize that we are no
longer dealing with property in the old sense? Does the traditional logic
of property still apply? Because an owner who also exercises control
over his wealth is protected in the full receipt of the advantages derived from it, must it necessarily follow that an owner who has surrendered control of his wealth should likewise be protected to the
full? May not this surrender have so essentially changed his relation to
his wealth as to have changed the logic applicable to his interest in that
wealth? An answer to this question cannot be found in the law itself.
It must be sought in the economic and social background of law."
(Pages 338-339.)
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It has already been contended, in this paper, that the ultimate management of and responsibility for an enterprise are not, in strict logic,
attributes of ownership, they are, and have been for a long time, historically contingent accidents of ownership. It is because, with the
traditional logic of property, they still regard management of and
responsibility for an enterprise as attributes rather than as accidents
of ownership, that the authors are driven into their undertaking, the
revision of fundamental economic concepts. Had they recognized the
commitment of the economy of individual private enterprise (and of
its ideologies) to a close association between property ownership and
management as one of the accidents of private enterprise in one of
its historical stages of development-the individual, pre-corporate system for which it was a socially justified desideratum-their reasoning
would have taken a different course.
The concept and the term "profits" have long been a stumbling
block for economic analysis, particularly in Anglo-American economic
(and other) literature. Both have been taken to cover, as a source of
income, an entity which was falsely regarded as being unitary, while
in reality there are two entities. These are (1) interest on capital and
(2) the gains of enterprise (entrepreneurial gains). They were not recognized as distinct categories of income simply because, by the historically contingent relationships of the system of individual private enterprise, they accrued, as a rule, to a single individual who in his own
person was both owner and manager.
Messrs. Berle and Means correctly observe, however, that "profits
act as a return for the performance of two separate functions. First,
they act as an inducement to the individual to risk his wealth in enterprise, and, second, they act as a spur, driving him to exercise his
utmost skill in making his enterprise profitable." (Page 341.) It is
unfortunate that the authors still cling to the term "profits" as a common name for these distinct types of income. The development of the
corporate system, by its separation of ownership and ultimate management, has brought about a clearer and more general recognition of
the distinction; it has not created that distinction itself.
A significant suggestion is made, pages 342-344, on the distribution
of the net income of a corporate enterprise. If it were put into practice,
it would have very far-reaching consequences.
"It is clear," it is said, "that the function of capital-supplying and
risk-taking must be performed and that the security holder must be
compensated if an enterprise is to raise new capital and expand its
activity, just as the workers must be paid enough to insure the continuous supplying of labor and the taking of the risks involved in that
labor and in the life based on it. But what if profits can be made, more
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than sufficient to induce new capital to come into the enterprise? Where
is the social advantage in setting aside for the security holder, profits
in an amount greater than is sufficient to insure the continued supplying of capital and taking of risk? The prospect of additional profits
cannot act as a spur on the security holder to make him operate the
enterprise with more vigor in a way to serve the wants of the community, since he is no longer in control. Such extra profits if given to
the security holders, would seem to perform no useful economic
function."
It is, therefore, suggested that instead of earmarking all profits for
the security holder, as demanded by the traditional logic of property,
"only a fair return to capital should be distributed to the 'owners';
while the remainder should go to the control as an inducement to the
most efficient ultimate management." There is, in this suggestion, a
recognition of the difference between the function of capital interest
as a compensation for capital-supplying and risk-taking and the function of entrepreneurial gains as reward for efficient ultimate management.
According to the traditional logic of property, which holds ultimate
management to be an "attribute" of property ownership, both capital
interest and entrepreneurial gains should fall to the share of the
owners of the enterprise. Where the owners no longer do and no
longer can manage and where, consequently, others who may have little
ownership interest in the enterprise take over its management, these
latter persons must, according to the traditional logic of property, be
regarded as exercising powers delegated to them by the owners, whose
original prerogatives they are. This logic, however, disregards the
fact, long since recognized by economists as such, that the entrepreneurial function is a function which cannot be delegated. If this fact
has not always been accepted or understood in the consequences implied, this has been due to a failure to single out the function which is
the characteristic function of entrepreneurs. The present writer is not
at all sure that Messrs. Berle and Means have segregated it and made
it sufficiently prominent in their analysis.
"In the development of the corporation," they write, p. 334, "constantly widening powers over the management of the enterprise have
been delegated to groups within the corporation. At first these powers
concerned mainly the technical (profit-making) activity of the enterprise. Later powers were delegated which had to do with the distribution of profits and interests among the security holders."
Of the powers here named as having been delegated, the first, concerned with the technical activity of the enterprise, is a managerial
function (which can be delegated) ; it is not an entrepreneurial func-
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tion (which cannot be delegated). The powers which have to do with
the distribution of profits and interests among security holders and
which are said to have been "delegated" later in the course of the
development of the corporation, are neither managerial nor entrepreneurial in character. Moreover, there is abundant evidence to be found
in the main body of the authors' treatise which can be read to show that
they have never been delegated at all but have been usurped.
Usurpation, rather than delegation, of powers is, in fact, abundantly recognized by the authors. One form which such usurpation has
taken is the exercise of legally delegated powers as if they were absolute. In either case, whether powers be delegated or usurped, the economic and legal status of the person or persons exercising them is involved. The recipient of delegated powers-primarily powers concerned
with the technical activities-will stand in the relation of a servant
to a master. Entrepreneurial powers, as already noted, cannot be delegated; they may, however, be surrendered, in which event the person
to whom they are surrendered himself becomes the entrepreneur. If
property-interest in the enterprise is retained, while entrepreneurial
powers are surrendered, the person or persons assuming the latter will
necessarily occupy a position of trustee toward destui que trust, that is,
toward the owners of the property-interest. Professors Berle and
Means have sufficiently pointed out the difficulties, factual and legal,
which stand in the way of a fully effective realization of such fiduciary
relationship.
Officials of corporate enterprises who have assumed the burden
of the entrepreneurial function may receive a salary, especially if they
also perform managerial functions, technical functions, in the broad
sense. Entrepreneurial functions, in the proper meaning of the term,
on the other hand, do not have a price which can be fixed by contract.
Entrepreneurial gains, being contingent upon the success or failure
attendant upon entrepreneurial decisions of disposal, represent a residual and uncertain income. Therefore, if the entrepreneurial functionwhich consists essentially in the making of decisions of disposal-rests
with a corporation official who receives a salary, such compensation
must be understood to be of the order of "normal remuneration" for
managerial functions. (Cf. John Meynard Keynes. Treatise on Money,
passim.) Entrepreneurial gains, in the strict sense, represent what
Mr. Keynes has aptly described as "windfalls." It is to such contingent
income that the application of the word "profit" might well be
restricted.
Professors Berle and Means have argued forcefully (pages 343344) that participation in such "windfalls" of enterprise may be necessary as an "inducement for those in control to manage the enterprise
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efficiently," as an inducement to "exert themselves beyond the amount
necessary to maintain a reasonably satisfied group of stockholders." As
we have already seen, they even suggest that to give to the stockholders
over enough to keep them satisfied and to make possible the raising of
new capital, would involve "an economically wasteful disposal." (Page
344.) Surplus profits (in the sense defined) would be better applied
"as an incentive to more efficient management by those in control,"
(P. 343), by the group of men "whose action is most important to the
efficient conduct of the enterprise."
This application of the traditional logic of profits, which stresses
the profit motive as the prime force in the motivation of economic
activity, leads our authors to the conclusion that "the corporation
would thus be operated financially in the interests of control, the stockholders becoming merely the recipients of the wages of capital." (P.
344.) This conclusion, however, is said to be "equally suspect" and as
unacceptable as the conchision of the traditional logic of property that
the corporation should be run financially in the interests of stockholders.
In the main body of their treatise, the authors have called attention
to the fact that shares of stock, preferred shares particularly, are progressively being reduced to the status of hired capital, like bonds and
debentures being made subject to fixed returns and to retirement at
the option of the company. It would seem to the writer that such and
other tendencies point in the direction of placing upon the entrepreneurial control greater burdens of risk-bearing and of financial responsibility for the successful or unsuccessful issue of its entrepreneurial
policies. It is all very well to assign "surplus profits"-as defined by the
authors-to the entrepreneurial control and to the superior managerial
officers as an inducement to, and bonus for, the most efficient ultimate
management. But, as the authors have so abundantly shown, various
devices, legal and extra-legal, can be and have been employed to divert
more than a proper share of the corporate income stream into the
pockets of "control" and "management." (See also: R. Weidenham.mer, Causes and Repercussions of the Faulty Investment of Corporate Savings-American Economic Review, Vol. 33, pp. 35-41, March,
1933.)
There has, of late, been considerable criticism of the high salaries
paid to executive officers of corporations. May it not be well to consider, in this connection, an enlargement of the burdens of risk-bearing
and financial responsibility rather than a forced reduction of salaries?
If the prevailing high corporate salaries represent, indeed, the proper
''normal remuneration" of men of high caliber and competence and,
if liberal bonuses represent a due reward for success in competitive
management, should there not be offsetting burdens and deductions
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for failure and inefficiency? Should risks and reduction in dividend
returns be borne wholly by stockholders whose risk-taking and capitalsupplying function it is proposed to reward with comparatively fixed
"wages of capital?" Would not competition thereby be re-introduced
in circles which by dint of place and power are said to have blanketed
the incidence of the selective force of competition upon themselves?
VII.

THE NEW CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION

In the concluding chapter, which bears as title the caption "the new
concept of the corporation," the authors have undertaken to "consider
and appraise certain of the more important lines of possible development." The possible lines of development considered are three:
First, operation of the bulk of American industry by trustees for
the sole benefit of inactive and irresponsible security holders, "accompanied by possible diminution of enterprise."
Second, operation of a corporation by the men in control in their
own interest, "with the corresponding danger of a corporate oligarchy
coupled with the probability of an era of corporate plundering."
Third, the modern corporation serving, "not alone the owners or
the control but all society."
How is this all-embracing service contemplated in the approved
final alternative to be obtained? In the words of the authors:
"It is conceivable-indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate
system is to survive-that the 'control' of the great corporations should
develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims
by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion
of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private
cupidity." (Page 356.)
That is a project and prospect which suggests to at least one reader
a comparison with the rule of philosopher-statesmen suggested by
Plato in his "Republic." "In still larger view"-a view which, by its
stress on economic rulership, brings it closer to Auguste Comte's forecast of rule by industrialist-statesmen-the authors suggest that: "the
modern corporation may be regarded not simply as one form of social
organization but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant institution of the modern world." (Page 356.) In the light of recent developments in this country and in Italy, particularly, that pronouncement
gains added significance as being indicative of the direction of winds
of doctrine. It need not, however, for that reason, be taken as
prophetic.
In their survey of possible lines of development, the authors have
neglected to appraise a fourth possibility of development which they
themselves have suggested but have rejected upon grounds which we
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shall presently consider. This possibility is represented by an operation
of industry under the guidance of entrepreneurial control and technical
management, working with hired capital which would be paid "wages
of capital"-that is capital interest-according to the appraisal by the
market of the hazards of the enterprise, including those of mistakes
in entrepreneurial policy and of faulty management. Operation of a
corporate enterprise under such conditions would obviate the necessity
of appraisal, by courts of law in the last instance, of such defenses of
entrepreneurial policy as "reasonable care," "honest judgment" and
"exigencies of business," which at best is difficult.
Professors Berle and Means have described and analyzed, with
great care and diligence, the structural transformation which the emergence and development of the modern corporation has brought about in
economic organization. In that organization, as transformed, the bearer
of the entrepreneurial function of making decisions of disposal more
than ever occupies the key position. Are we permitted to observe, then,
a corresponding transformation in the character of the entrepreneurial
agent himself which parallels the structural transformation in economic organization? Professor Josef Schumpeter, of the University of
Bonn, who has repeatedly lectured at American universities, has described the entrepreneur as an innovator, characterized, in the past,
chiefly by distinctive qualities of will, as a man of daring in the choice
of his course and of persistence in the pursuit of it once it has been
chosen. Since writing this characterization of the entrepreneur, Professor Schumpeter has also expressed his expectation of the development of an entrepreneur of rather different type, a type more distinguished by qualities of intellect, relying for his guidance more upon
research (market analysis, business forecasting, and the like), rather
than upon instinct and intuition. (See the citation of Schumpeter's
view in the article by Robert Weidenhammer named above, a citation
which is based on Schumpeter's article on "The Instability of Capitalism," in the Economic Journal, September, 1928.)
The fourth possibility of development which we have mentioned
above has been rejected by Professors Berle and Means. The grounds
for their rejection of it are found in reflections upon "the profit
motive" as the prime mover to economic activity. Such sociological
reflections are not without interest; but they contribute little to the
refinement of economic concepts, particularly if they are concerned
with what ought to be rather than with what is.
VIII.

IN CONCLUSION

We have, in this paper, sought to answer critically the three questions stated in the Introduction. We may now briefly summarize our
conclusions.
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To the question, the first, whether the development of the corporate
system necessitates a modification or revision of fundamental economic
concepts, we have given a twofold answer. Our answer has been both
positive and negative.
Our answer has been positive in so far as we have held that a revision of some economic concepts would be well-advised. This holds
good especially for the concepts of private property and of "profits."
The correction of the concept of "profits" as an ambiguous concept
has already been made by economists in an analysis of economic realities. We have only contended that our authors have not observed this
correction with sufficient strictness and fidelity. The revision of the
concept of private property, which we also believe to be called for, still
awaits formulation. We have found that the authors, while explicitly
repudiating "the traditional logic of property," are still more consistently involved in this tradition than they seem to realize.
Our answer has been negative in so far as we have denied that the
development of the corporate system, in and of itself alone, furnishes
sufficient grounds for the revision of fundamental economic concepts.
With respect to the thoroughness of the authors' revision of economic concepts, the second of our questions, we have stated three conclusions: (1) that, as already indicated above, the authors' abandonment of the traditional logics of property and of "profits" has not been
so thorough-going as their repudiation of them has been emphatic;
(2) that they have not drawn to the full the conclusions which are
implicit in the revision of the concept of "profits" which they have,
not so much fashioned as accepted; (3) that, consequently, the authors
find, as they are bound to find, a contradiction between the logic of
"profits" (described as "traditional" but in reality a revised logic) and
the traditional logic of property; and that they do find this contradiction because they have not really and thoroughly revised the latter
concept.
The consideration and appraisal of possible lines of development
also falls somewhat short of its promise because of these limitations of
the preceding analysis. The two possible lines of development which
are rejected flow, indeed, from the traditional logics of property and
profits-and that is why they are rejected. The third possible line of
development is accepted and welcomed, despite its obviously radical
character, because it does not flow from either of these two logicswhich indeed it does not. It flows rather from sociological reflections
-and these are rather utopian. Another possible line of development,
which would be a valid projection from the revised logic of property
which we have suggested and from the already revised logic of
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"profits" accepted by the authors, has been rejected on the grounds of
the sociological reflections already noted.
We have taken exception to the methodological presuppositions
which we have found to underlie the revision of economic concepts
proposed. The authors have deplored the fact that the application of
the logic of two major disciplines, economics and law, leads to divergent results. We have held that the duality of the objectives of the
respective disciplines calls for a corresponding dualism of methods.
Economic analysis has too often and too long operated with some concepts which were too much weighted with legal reflections and presuppositions. On the other hand, the law has often put constructions upon
economic concepts which properly they should not bear. A revision of
economic concepts will be more thorough and more valid if it is predicated upon purely economic data and upon an economic analysis
thereof.
The critical exceptions here recorded do not, and are not designed
to, disparage in any way the value of the main body of the authors'
very fine treatise (Books I, II and III). While we do not agree with
many of the "deductions and speculations" in the concluding Book,
we are duly grateful for the stimulation to thought which they certainly
convey.

